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Abstract 
This paper is part of the results of the ex-post evaluation of INTERREG III which was carried 
out on behalf of the European Commission during 2008 to 2010. One of the tasks was to assess 
the impact of INTERREG III on a harmonious regional development and integration throughout 
Europe. This paper is focussed on INTERREG-Strand A (cross-border co-operation). The 
empirical analysis, based on factor with subsequent regression analysis, suggests that 
predominantly experimental project types and history of co-operation matter for EU cross-border 
economic integration, while the strength of co-operation in the cross-border regional 
development programmes seems not to matter at all.  
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Cross-border Co-operation and European Economic Integration: An 
Empirical Analysis  
 
Rolf Bergs1 
 
________________ 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper is part of the results of the ex-post evaluation of INTERREG III which 
was carried out by the consortium of Panteia2 on behalf of the European 
Commission during 2008 to 2010. One of the tasks was to assess the impact of 
INTERREG III on a harmonious regional development and integration 
throughout Europe. Although the impact was to be estimated for all three 
strands of INTERREG, this paper is focussed on strand A (cross-border co-
operation). 
 
The aim of INTERREG has been the enhancement of trans-European co-
operation across borders and to contribute to further socio-economic integration 
of the EU area. Economic integration has been a major purpose of the Union 
since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This integration process has so far been driven 
by major forces, many of them institutional milestones like the Common Market, 
the abolishment of border controls (Schengen) or the European Monetary Union. 
All those institutional decisions have been taken in the course of the European 
political and economic evolution because the level of development and 
integration has advanced to a high degree and because of the expectation that 
those institutional decisions will further foster this economic integration process. 
This integration process is visible by increasing trade volumes among the 
countries and regions, more aligned business cycles and higher levels and 
intensities of intra-industry trade (reducing adverse shocks in a monetary 
union). Still, national borders matter, as they represent impediments to trade.3 
Furthermore, those major institutional forces have also contributed to growth in 
border regions, but not equally4. Geography and spatial path dependencies are 
important factors to be considered. The question to be addressed in this paper is: 
Does INTERREG also play a role in those long-run integration processes? 
 
 
                                                 
1 PRAC, Im Hopfengarten 19b, D-65812 Bad Soden, Germany; www.prac.de 
2 Panteia NL (lead partner), EureConsult (L), Géphyres (F), PRAC (D) and Radboud University (NL) 
3 Chen (2004), pp. 114 f. 
4 In an interesting empirical study on the French-Spanish border region, M. Lafourcade and E. Paluzie 
(2005) show that ‘ … as for the impact of trade liberalization on this trade outperformance, [we show 
that], whereas the north-eastern French border regions located close to European market potentials 
succeeded in triggering new extra trade, more peripheral border regions, unfortunately, did not. 
Although temporary gains were drawn from integration shocks such as the Single European Act, the 
Schengen Agreement and the Maastricht Treaty, they were not sufficient to counteract the drastic long-
term decline suffered by the southern French regions bordering Spain and Italy. …’ (p.28)  
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The problem: A minor EU policy initiative with a major goal 
 
The immediate impact of INTERREG with Europe-wide expenditure of around 
7.6 billion Euro is – to say the least - highly extensive. Per capita5, just Euro 16.70 
was spent by INTERREG activities for all three strands during the 2000-2006 
period (ERDF, national public and private). Hence, to assume that investment of 
those funds will have a perceptible immediate impact on economic growth and 
cohesion in supporting the supply side of the economies in the longer run and to 
trigger shorter-run demand side effects (like those of Objective 1) would be 
rather misleading6. If at all, the purpose of INTERREG must be therefore more 
focused on the indirect effects. Indirect effects, in many cases very incidental 
ones, are those effects that are generated by the existence of the programme 
itself or by its projects. It can also be the success of a programme or specific 
projects to reduce mutual prejudice, to enhance cross-cultural understanding 
and thus to improve market transparency across borders. Indirect effects cannot 
be a priori defined and are thus not observable (“trade fair effects” from events 
or networking). It is possible to record such effects by sample surveys, but most 
such effects are not generated by INTERREG alone, but only in an overall 
context, in which also other incidental factors may play a role. E.g. a social or 
business event, supported by INTERREG, can initiate the establishment of some 
business cooperation or a network, simply because people with similar interest 
find together in a conducive atmosphere. In some cases, this may have medium 
or longer-term impacts on local growth and employment. 
 
Such impacts resulting from indirect INTERREG effects may thus further 
depend on different overall economic or administrative frame conditions. These 
are either related to institutional milestones of European evolution (e.g. the 
Schengen border or the EMU), location factors or economic trends (trade, 
business cycles, structural change). Hence, there is some theoretical justification 
to assume that INTERREG matters for economic integration but the empirical 
evidence for that is much harder to establish. One problem is how economic 
integration, especially that evolving in European border regions, should be 
defined. This will be discussed further below. The second, more important, 
problem is related to the adequacy of data available. 
 
Within the ex-post evaluation of INTERREG III a survey among managing 
authorities of more than 80% of the programmes was carried out. This survey 
aimed to establish some kind of a composite performance indicator to cluster the 
programmes (facilitating the selection of case studies for in-depth evaluation) 
and to examine the influence of co-operation history. This analysis could 
generate some interesting results, also relevant for our empirical analysis, 
especially with respect to numerous different sub-variables of the composite 
                                                 
5 Assuming a population of 455,299,000 million EU inhabitants in 2006 (EUROSTAT) 
6 There are only few examples of INTERREG strand A programmes with substantial physical investment, 
where demand side effects may materialise in the local economies. One example is co-operation between 
Portugal and Spain.  
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indicator. Those sub-variables are related to the strength of partnership, 
institutional strength, nature of projects and others7. Based on the results of the 
programme survey of the ex-post evaluation, our expectation would be that 
more experience in co-operation would have a stronger developmental impact 
than a rather newly started co-operation. An important a priori hypothesis of the 
evaluation was the assumption, that history matters. Furthermore, the 
complexity and innovativeness of projects might differ revealing a certain level 
of development of a region. A sound joint analysis of needs for a border region 
could also have a positive effect as this might have led to better coordinated 
programme strategies and their implementation. 
 
Now one could try to use these survey data to estimate the impact of the sub-
variables on economic integration. However, a direct econometric estimation of 
the impact on integration across borders is hardly possible8. It is also necessary 
to consider the important major forces governing cross-border integration 
outside INTERREG. These are the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), Schengen, language, business cycles, level of bi-lateral market 
integration and perhaps further ones.  However, many of those forces 
superimpose the INTERREG-specific results and are closely interrelated with 
them. Multicollinearity is a problem if just merging all those variables in a 
regression analysis. The idea to get closer to an insight into the relevance of 
INTERREG for economic integration is to consider all those INTERREG and non-
INTERREG influences as co-variates and to run a factor analysis incorporating 
the survey-related indicators and further indicators determining economic 
integration across borders. Hence, the factor analysis will be used to specify the 
right-hand side of the regression equation, while economic integration will be 
the left-hand term. 
 
 
A simple index of cross-border economic integration 
 
Economic integration can be regarded from the viewpoint of trade (e.g. volumes 
and similarity) or income (GDP) or both. Empirically, geographical distance and 
income levels determine trade volume between two countries (gravity). While 
the gravity model has a strong empirical relevance for trade across borders at 
national level9, geographical distance plays only a minor role in local cross-
border trade between two countries at district level. Another prominent 
indicator measuring market integration is the Grubel-Lloyd-Index for intra-
industry trade. But the lack of sub-national trade data across the EU does not 
allow working with neither the gravity model nor the Grubel-Lloyd-Index at the 
level of border regions. However, the level of intra-industry trade of adjacent 
countries may have itself an influence on integration in border regions, therefore 
this variable can be conceived as one of the variables entering the factor analysis.  
                                                 
7 Cf. Panteia and Partners (2009), pp.251 ff.  
8 A regression with the sub-variables of the survey did not yield significant results. 
9 E.g. Chen (2004) for cross-border trade in the EU or McCallum (1995) for US-Canadian trade 
    
 
6 
 
 
A feasible way to view economic integration in border regions could be a 
respective definition that is more related to economic cohesion10. As INTERREG 
is anyway part of EU Cohesion Policy, aimed at increasing and balancing 
regional income levels, it is suggested to base the analysis on GDP per capita 
(PPS). This indicator is anyway the core context criterion for eligibility of 
cohesion funding; harmonised data are available at regional levels. However, 
raw GDP per capita data as such do not reveal anything about integration; 
rather, an adequate variable must indicate a spatial relationship of income 
(between the regions themselves and between the regions and a reference). So 
far, for cross-border regional development there is no ready-made variable that 
has been applied and empirically tested. Therefore we had to explore other ways 
to define a suitable and simple solution. In our model, the final dependent 
variable aims to simultaneously capture the inter-regional disparity and the 
disparity between the regions and the EU average. The variable DI (degree of 
integration) is defined as a simple index: 
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(y means GDP per capita [PPS], while i and j are the regions).  
 
The data are to be obtained from the regional statistics of Eurostat (at NUTS 2 
level). Only member states are covered. Integration of non-member states with 
the EU cannot be observed at the NUTS 2 level. It is to be noted that regional 
GDP levels above or equal the EU average are cut-off and set equal to the EU 
average assuming that integration at this level is already achieved. The 
multiplicand of the first index measures the inter-regional difference, while the 
other two multipliers show the difference between the regions and the EU 
average. If in the first index the first factor is 1, both regions have the same 
income per capita. Then the more important weight is on the difference with 
respect to the EU average. This special case would be ܦܫ ൌ ቆ1 ൅
௬ಶೆି 
భ
మ
൫௬೔ା௬ೕ൯
௬ಶೆ
ቇ
ଶ
  
(for yi = yj). 
                                                 
10 Spatial proximity (as a constant in local cross-border trade) and income levels determine bi-lateral local 
trade volumes. Therefore cohesion and trade are directly linked to each other via the gravity function. 
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The second (and third) index only emphasises the disparity between the poorer 
region and the EU (while the richer region is already equal or better-off than the 
EU average). The fourth index is set 1 for both regions already equal or above 
the EU level, thus having already achieved full integration. Any deviations from 
that theoretical optimum are at values > 1. Those deviations reflect inter-
regional disparities and/or disparities between regions and the EU average.11 
 
The database was elaborated by calculating the index for all combinations of 
NUTS 2 borders. Thus, not the programmes, but the different border sectors are 
viewed. Hence within one programme different index values can appear. The 
following figure shows the slope of the distribution of the index results (ranked). 
 
 
 
 
 
The model, the assumptions and the data 
 
For the factor analysis 35 “Strand A” programmes from all six clusters were 
taken12. Altogether 98 border sectors are represented. The set of variables 
comprises the survey variables, originally calculated for the typology of 
                                                 
11 It could be subject to further discussion which EU average should be selected. We propose the EU15 
average because for the EU27 average still bigger disparities (due to the lower living standards of the new 
member countries) are reflected.  
12 Twelve programmes out of the 35 were pre-selected from the clusters by the European Commission (for 
the purpose of programme case studies in the context of the ex-post evaluation INTERREG III), the 
additional 23 were selected randomly from the clusters. Bi-lateral programmes with external borders were 
excluded, because of the missing GDP data. Furthermore, the problem that the programme survey failed 
to generate data on programmes with Greek managing authorities may have induced some minor bias. 
Thus, the results are to be interpreted for the European Union without Greece.  
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INTERREG programmes (HIST, JOINTN, PART, LOC, JOINTP, IMPACT)13 plus 
different dichotomous (dummy) or interval-scaled non-INTERREG variables like 
Schengen (0;1), EMU (0;1)14, language (0;1), business cycle synchronisation 
(correlation of NUTS 2 growth rates), market integration of the national states 
(i.e. the Grubel-Lloyd index on intra-industry trade). Schengen and EMU reflect 
a high level of economic and social integration between member states. Both 
have been the outcome of an integration process but they also further reinforce 
that process, thus being both, cause as well as effect. As already mentioned, 
intra-industry trade is an important economic indicator of market integration, a 
major criterion of real convergence and thus also of importance for a functioning 
monetary union. We therefore also expect a high correlation between IIT and 
EMU. Different business cycles of countries with common borders may also have 
at least short-term impacts on economic integration, because these might 
influence the relative purchasing powers on both sides of the border. Finally 
different languages are certainly an important barrier of co-operation. It might 
thus also influence the cross-border local markets to some extent.  
 
We deliberately excluded programme budgets as we do not expect them to be 
decisive in wider economic impacts materialised by EMU, Schengen, IIT etc. 
 
In a first step, the correlation of all variables will be calculated. Eigenvalues and 
related Eigenvectors of the correlation matrix will then determine factors 
capturing the a.m. variables15. A Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sample adequacy test will 
help to decide whether the matrix is statistically adequate for a factor analysis 
(threshold minimum: 0.5). If yes, the process will consequently lead to a 
condensation of information by reducing the number of variables. Within those 
factors, variables will have different loadings (i.e. the correlation between the 
variable and the factor). In order to clearly interpret the factor matrix, a rotation 
(e.g. an orthogonal varimax rotation) is necessary. The factor loadings of the 
rotated factor matrix may then allow comparing the relationship of sub-
                                                 
13 HIST denotes the extent of co-operation tradition prior to the commencement of INTERREG III, JOINTN 
denotes in how far needs for a programme were examined jointly, PART denotes the scope and depth of 
strategic partnership, LOC denotes the depth and nature of co-operation, i.e. the lead partnership activity, 
location advantages and complexity of co-operation, JOINTP denotes the extent to which projects are 
truly joint and IMPACT denotes the level of a wider policy related institutional impact. The data are 
based on either factual quantitative results (e.g. historical duration of cross-border co-operation) or 
qualitative scoring (e.g. 0-20-40-60-80-100). Of course, qualitative scoring is not strictly based on empirical 
facts, but rather on self-reported assessment and assumption. There is always emphasis on personal 
interest (what is important for “me” if “I” view the programme?) and an emotional bias in such 
statements. However, we can assume that because of the large number of observations among 
programmes the level of objectiveness can be regarded as acceptable. All variables are described in the 
first interim report of the ex-post evaluation, cf. Panteia and Partners (2009).  
14 The value 0 means the existence of an exchange rate, 1 means Eurozone. As regards the exchange rate 
regimes there are still major differences among the member states and participating non-member states 
(from a currency board, quasi-equivalent to EMU, to a floating regime, e.g. between Ireland and the 
United Kingdom). A further differentiation of the variable would stipulate a more elaborated economic 
model, and is hardly possible within the scope of that task. Border economics as a section of economics is 
still at an early stage. Modelling so far is more or less confined on currency market fluctuation impact on 
cross-border regional retail segments. It is to be referred to Thomas M. Fullerton Jr. 2003; Furthermore: 
Ardair et al. 2006 
15 Factor determination by the principal components analysis 
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indicators of the overall composite indicator with the other major variables 
within one factor. Hence, also a ranking of importance of the sub-indicators can 
be determined. In a final regression analysis (second step), the influence of the 
determined factors on the dependent variable (see above) will be estimated. The 
regression coefficients may then suggest statistical evidence whether factors 
hamper or foster integration.  
 
 
Results of the multivariate analysis: First step: Factor analysis 
 
The principal component analysis with Varimax rotation comprised the 
INTERREG variables HIST, JOINTN, PART, LOC, JOINTP and IMPACT merged 
with EMU (1;0), SCHENGEN (1;0), CYCLE (Business cycle synchronisation: 
correlation of national growth rates)16, LANGU (common language: 1;0) and IIT 
(national Grubel-Lloyd index)17. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin sample adequacy test 
value is at 0.797 and thus clearly confirms adequacy of the factor model. Out of 
the eleven vectors four Eigenvalues > 1 were extracted, leading to four factors as 
the following table shows. 
 
 
Eigenvalues extracted 
 
Variables/factors Eigenvalues 
F1 4.658 
F2 1.356 
F3 1.197 
F4 1.055 
F5 0.709 
F6 0.538 
F7 0.500 
F8 0.433 
F9 0.254 
F10 0.160 
F11 0.141 
 
 
In those four factors the rotated factor loadings are of major interest. These show 
the correlation between the different eleven variables and the condensed 
information captured by the four extracted factors. In the following table we see 
that in factor 4 only the synchronisation of business cycles is loading high (> 
0.5). In factor 3, only three INTERREG variables (JOINTN, PART and LOC) show 
high loadings. This factor can be thus described as the intensity and level of 
project co-operation. Factor 2 includes language and IMPACT as variables with 
                                                 
16 Database for growth correlations from Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung 2006; 
Heston, A., et. al (2002),  
17 Data from Caetano and Galego (2007) 
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higher loadings, combining some emphasis on the socio-cultural factor (IMPACT 
indicates the mutual impact on institutional learning and adaptation). Finally 
factor 1 with the highest percentage of variation in the rotated factors 
predominantly includes high-loading variables defining the historically grown 
level of development of a region. These are EMU (the Monetary Union), the level 
of market integration (IIT), the existence of a Schengen border, the history of co-
operation and LOC, showing the level of complexity of the INTERREG 
interventions. Interestingly, in factors 3 and 4, the INTERREG variables are 
clearly separated from the non-INTERREG variables. Only in factor 1 we 
identify a combination of major weight of INTERREG and non-INTERREG 
variables. We see that history (experience in co-operation), the level of 
institutional integration, revealed by Schengen and EMU (derived from a 
historical process of development and integration) and confirmed by the level of 
intra-industry trade, are closely interrelated. In addition to that, we see that the 
INTERREG variable LOC also seems to matter in this context. The level of 
innovativeness and the pattern of complexity of projects are reflected by this 
variable. We can definitely not say that this variable has an important influence 
or whether LOC describes causes or rather effects18. In fact we strongly assume 
that it rather reflects an effect due to a high association between the historical 
grown level of development and the resulting pattern of co-operation projects. 
Nevertheless, we can at least say, that LOC matters within the economic context 
of INTERREG strand A.  
 
Table 2: Varimax Rotated Loadings19 
 
Factor1   Factor2   Factor3  Factor 4 
HIST   0.807   0.088   0.087   0.100 
JOINTN   0.320   -0.220   0.702   0.133 
PART   -0.177   0.340   0.776   0.064 
LOC   0.576   0.102   0.553   0.042 
JOINTP   0.500   0.470   0.429   -0.153 
IMPACT  0.252   0.719   0.213   -0.175 
EMU   0.895   0.096   -0.020   0.278 
SCHENG  0.700   0.262   0.317   0.417 
CYCLE   0.165   0.010   0.120   0.933 
LANGU   0.155   0.745   -0.115   0.366 
IIT   0.852   0.306   0.089   -0.078 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 If we established that causal relationship, we would assume cum hoc ergo propter hoc, a major logical error 
in interpreting correlation compared to regression. 
19 Percent of Variation in Rotated Factors 
Factor 1: 31.799 
Factor 2: 14.970 
Factor 3: 16.113 
Factor 4: 12.260 
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Second step: Regression analysis 
 
The factor analysis alone cannot establish an estimate how the factors above 
(incorporating INTERREG intervention) influence the economic integration of 
the European Union. To shed more light on the weight of the different factors in 
their impact on integration, we can use the factor matrix (factors as latent 
independent variables).  Our linear regression model is hence: 
 
Integration = a + b1·z1 + b2·z2 + b3·z3 + b4·z4 + u, whereby z1 … z4 represent the 
matrix of factor scores. 
 
The estimates are the following: 
 
Table 3: Regression results (Dependent variable: Integration) 
 
Variable Beta b s.e. t HC-t20 
Factor 1 (z1) -0.488 -0.293 0.054  -5.449***21  -4.898*** 
Factor 2 (z2) -0.163 -0.104 0.056  -1.854*  -1.850* 
Factor 3 (z3) -0.072 -0.047 0.057  -0.820 n.s.  -0.713 n.s. 
Factor 4 (z4) -0.183 -0.085 0.042  -2.042**  -2.601** 
Intercept  0.000  1.684 0.048 35.322*** 30.703*** 
 
F = 11.17 *** 
R2 = 0.34 
Adjusted R2 = 0.31 
 
Signs of the coefficients are as expected (the higher the index values the lower 
the level of integration). The highly significant determination coefficient 
suggests with 0.34 a sufficiently strong relationship. Interestingly, factor 3 is not 
significant at all, factor 1, however, is strong and highly significant, showing 
that actually only the level of economic development is an explanatory factor 
(variable) for integration across borders. The factor with the majority of the 
INTERREG variables (co-operation factor) does not matter for economic 
integration. Business cycles and socio-cultural factors matter to some minor 
extent. Two conclusions can be derived from that. The first one is that 
INTERREG does not appear to play an important role in economic integration of 
the EU. Basically there is little relationship. The second conclusion is however 
that we cannot claim that INTERREG does not matter at all with a view to 
economic integration. 
 
Since in factor 1 the INTERREG variables ‘history of co-operation’ and LOC load 
higher, our conclusion would be that for INTERREG to further pursue economic 
integration across borders, patience may play a role (as history matters), and 
furthermore projects with experimental and innovative character should be 
                                                 
20 Heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values, based on White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent variance matrix. 
21 ***/**/* means significant at the 0.01/0.05/0.1 level; n.s.: not significant 
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supported. Even though there is the strong assumption that LOC is much more 
effect than cause within factor 1, we can always assume some circular causation, 
and thus the possibility that indirect impacts from experimentation in cross-
border co-operation play also some minor role in integration processes22.  
 
LOC has certainly no influence on institutional variables like EMU or Schengen.  
But it may have an influence on history, namely to accelerate development 
processes in border regions and to mature faster.  
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